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Abstract. Information-flow security type systems ensure confidential-
ity by enforcing noninterference: a program cannot leak private data
to public channels. However, in practice, programs need to selectively
declassify information about private data. Several approaches have pro-
vided a notion of relaxed noninterference supporting selective and ex-
pressive declassification while retaining a formal security property. The
labels-as-functions approach provides relaxed noninterference by means
of declassification policies expressed as functions. The labels-as-types
approach expresses declassification policies using type abstraction and
faceted types, a pair of types representing the secret and public facets
of values. The original proposal of labels-as-types is formulated in an
object-oriented setting where type abstraction is realized by subtyping.
The object-oriented approach however suffers from limitations due to its
receiver-centric paradigm.
In this work, we consider an alternative approach to labels-as-types, ap-
plicable in non-object-oriented languages, which allows us to express ad-
vanced declassification policies, such as extrinsic policies, based on a
different form of type abstraction: existential types. An existential type
exposes abstract types and operations on these; we leverage this ab-
straction mechanism to express secrets that can be declassified using the
provided operations. We formalize the approach in a core functional cal-
culus with existential types, define existential relaxed noninterference,
and prove that well-typed programs satisfy this form of type-based re-
laxed noninterference.
1 Introduction
A sound information-flow security type system ensures confidentiality by means
of noninterference, a property that states that public values (e.g. StringL) do
not depend on secret values (e.g. StringH). This enables a modular reasoning
principle about well-typed programs. For instance, in a pure language, a function
f : StringH → StringL is necessary a constant function because the (public) result
cannot leak information about the (private) argument.
⋆ This work is partially funded by CONICYT FONDECYT Regular Projects 1150017
and 1190058. Raimil Cruz is partially funded by CONICYT-PCHA/Doctorado
Nacional/2014-63140148
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However, noninterference is too stringent and real programs need to explic-
itly declassify some information about secret values. A simple mechanism to
support explicit declassification is to add a declassify operator from secret to
public expressions, as provided for instance in Jif [11]. However, the arbitrary
use of this operator breaks formal guarantees about confidentiality. Providing a
declassification mechanism while still enforcing a noninterference-like property
is an active topic of research [5, 6, 8, 9, 13, 16].
One interesting mechanism is the labels-as-functions approach of Li and
Zdancewic [9], which supports declassification policies while ensuring relaxed
noninterference. Instead of using security labels such as L and H that are taken
from a security lattice of symbols, security labels are functions. These functions,
called declassification policies, denote the intended computations to declassify
values. For instance, the function λx.λy.x == y denotes the declassification pol-
icy: “the result of the comparison of the secret value x with the public value y can
be declassified”. The identity function denotes public values, while a constant
function denotes secret values. Then, any use of a value that does not follow its
declassification policy yields a secret result. The labels-as-functions approach is
very expressive, but its main drawback is that label ordering relies on a semantic
interpretation of functions and program equivalence, which is hard to realize in
practice and rules out recursive declassification policies1.
An alternative approach to labels-as-functions is labels-as-types, recently pro-
posed by Cruz et al. [5]. The key idea is to exploit type abstraction to control
how much of a value is open to declassification. The approach was originally
developed in an object-oriented language, where type abstraction is realized by
subtyping. A security type T ⊳ U is composed of two facets: the safety type
T denotes the secret view of the value, and the declassification type U (such
that T <: U) specifies the public view, i.e. the methods that can be used to
declassify a secret value. For instance, the type String ⊳ String denotes a pub-
lic string value, i.e. all the methods of String are available for declassification,
while the type String ⊳⊤ (where ⊤ is the empty interface type) denotes a secret
String value, i.e. there is no method available to declassify information about
the secret. Then, the interesting declassification policies are expressed with a
type interface between String and ⊤; e.g. the type String ⊳ StringLen exposes
the method length of String for declassification. With this type-based approach,
label ordering is simplified to standard subtyping, which is a simple syntactic
property, and naturally supports recursive declassification. Also, this type-based
approach enforces a security property called type-based relaxed noninterference,
which accounts for type-based declassification and provides a modular reasoning
principle similar to standard noninterference.
We observe that developing type-based relaxed noninterference in an object-
oriented setting, exploiting subtyping as the type abstraction mechanism, im-
poses some restrictions on the declassification policies that can be expressed. In
particular, because security types are of the form T ⊳ U where the declassifica-
1 Li and Zdancewic [9] rule out recursive declassification because otherwise the sub-
typing relation induced by security labels (sets of functions) would be undecidable.
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tion type U is a supertype of the safety type T—a necessary constraint to ensure
type safety—means that one cannot declassify properties that are extrinsic to
(i.e. computed externally from) the secret value. For instance, because a typical
String type does not feature an encrypt method, it is not possible to express
the declassification policy that “the encrypted representation of the password is
public”.
In this paper, we explore an alternative approach to labels-as-types and re-
laxed noninterference, exploiting another well-known type abstraction mecha-
nism: existential types. An existential type ∃X.T provides an abstract type X
and an interface T to operate with values of the abstract type X . Then instances
of the abstract type X are akin to secrets that can be declassified using the op-
erations described by T . For instance, the existential type ∃X.[get : X, length :
X → Int] makes it possible to obtain a (secret) value of type X with get, that
only can be “declassified” with the length function to obtain a (public) integer.
Because existential types are the essence of abstraction mechanisms like ab-
stract data types and modules [10], this work shows how the labels-as-types
approach can be applied in non-object-oriented languages. The only required
extension is the notion of faceted types, which are necessary to capture the nat-
ural separation between privileged observers (allowed to observe secret results)
and public observers (i.e. the attacker, which can only observe public values) 2.
Additionally, the existential approach is more expressive than the object-oriented
one in that extrinsic declassification policies can naturally be encoded with ex-
istential types.
The contributions of this work are:
– We explore an alternative type abstraction mechanism to realize the labels-
as-types approach to expressive declassification, retaining the practical as-
pect of using an existing mechanism (here, existential types), while support-
ing more expressive declassification policies (Section 2).
– We define a new version of type-based relaxed noninterference, called exis-
tential relaxed noninterference, which accounts for extrinsic declassification
using existential types (Section 3).
– We capture the essence of the use of existential types for relaxed noninterfer-
ence in a core functional language λ∃SEC (Section 4), and prove that its type
system soundly enforces existential relaxed noninterference (Section 5).
Section 6 explains how the formal definitions apply by revisiting an example
from Section 3. Section 7 discuses related work and Section 8 concludes.
2 Overview
We now explain how to use the type abstraction mechanism of existential types to
denote secrets that can be selectively declassified. First, we give a quick overview
2 To account for n > 2 observation levels, faceted types can be extended to have n
facets.
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of existential types, with their introduction and elimination forms. Next, we
develop the intuitive connection between the type abstraction of standard ex-
istential types and security typing. Then, we show that to support computing
with secrets, which is natural for information-flow control languages, we need to
introduce faceted types.
2.1 Existential types
An existential type ∃X.T is a pair of an (abstract) type variable X and a type
T where X is bound; typically T provides operations to create, transform and
observe values of the abstract type X [10].
For instance, the type AccountStore below models a simplified user repository.
It provides the password of a user at type X with the function userPass and a
function verifyPass to check (observe) whether an arbitrary string value is equal
to the password.
AccountStore , ∃X.[ userPass : String → X
verifyPass : String → X → Bool]
Values of an existential type ∃X.T take the form of a package that packs
together the representation type for the abstract type X with an implementation
v of the operations provided by T . One can think of packages as modules with
signatures.
For instance, the package p
△
= pack(String, v) as AccountStore is a value of
type AccountStore, where String is the representation type and v, defined below,
is a record implementing functions userPass and verifyPass:
v , [ userPass = λx : String. userPassFromDb(x)
verifyPass = λx : String.λy : String. equal(x, y)]
Note that the implementation, v, directly uses the representation type String,
e.g. userPass has type String → String and is implemented using a primitive
function userPassFromDb : String → String to retrieve the user password from a
database. Likewise, the implementation of verifyPass uses equality between its
arguments of type String.
To use an existential type, we have to open the package (i.e. import the
module) to get access to the implementation v, along with the abstract type
that hides the actual representation type. The expression open(X, x) = p in e′
opens the package p above, exposing the representation type abstractly as a type
variable X , and the implementation as term variable x, within the scope of the
body e′. Crucially, the expression e′ has no access to the representation type
String, therefore nothing can be done with a value of type X , beyond using it
with the operations provided by AccountStore.
2.2 Type-based declassification policies with existential types
We can establish an analogy between existential types and selective declassifica-
tion of secrets: an existential type ∃X.T exposes operations to obtain secret val-
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ues, at the abstract type X , and the operations of T can be used to declassify
theses secrets.
For instance, AccountStore provides a secret string password with the function
userPass, and the function verifyPass expresses the declassification policy: “the
comparison of a secret password with a public string can be made public”. With
this point of view, concrete types such as Bool and String represent public values.
A fully-secret value, i.e. a secret that is not declassified, can be modeled by an
existential type without any observation function for the abstract type.
We can use the declassification policy modeled with AccountStore to imple-
ment a valid well-typed login functionality. The login function below is defined
in a scope where the package p of type AccountStore is opened, providing the
type name X for the abstract type and the variable store for the package imple-
mentation.
open(X, store) = p in
...
String login (String guess , String username){
if ( store . verifyPass (guess, store .userPass(username)))
...
}
The login function first obtains the user secret password of type X with
store.userPass(username), and then passes the secret password (of type X) to the
function verifyPass with the guess public password to obtain the public boolean
result. The above code makes a valid use of AccountStore and therefore is well-
typed.
The type abstraction provided by AccountStore avoids leaking information
accidentally. For instance, directly returning the secret password of type X
is a type error, even though internally it is a string. Likewise, the expression
length(store.userPass(username)) is ill-typed.
Note that because declassification relies on the abstraction mechanism of
existential types, we work under the assumption that the person that writes
the security policy—the package implementation and the existential type—is
responsible for not leaking the secret due to a bad implementation or specifi-
cation (e.g. exposing the secret password through the identity function of type
X → String).
Progressive declassification. The analogy of existential types as a mechanism
to express declassification holds when one considers progressive declassifica-
tion [5, 9], which refers to the possibility of only declassifying information after a
sequence of operations is performed. With existential types, we can express pro-
gressive declassification by constraining the creation of secrets based on other
secrets.
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Consider the following refinement of AccountStore, which supports the de-
classification policy “whether an authenticated user’s salary is above $100,000”:
AccountStore , ∃X,Y, Z.[ userPass : String → X
verifyPass : String → X → Option [Y ]
userSalary : Y → Z
isSixDigit : Z → Bool]
AccountStore provides extra abstract types Y and Z, denoting an authentica-
tion token (for a specific user) and a user salary, respectively. The type signatures
enforce that, to obtain the user salary, the user must be authenticated: a value
of type Y is needed to apply userSalary. Such a value can be obtained only af-
ter successful authentication: verifyPass now returns an Option [Y ] value, instead
of a Bool value. Note that the salary itself is secret, since it has the abstract
type Z. Finally, isSixDigit function reveals whether a salary is above $100,000 by
returning a public boolean result.
Observe how the use of abstract type variables allows the existential type to
enforce sequencing among operations. Also, we can provide more declassification
policies for a user salary Z, and can use the authentication token Y with more
operations. An existential type is therefore an expressive means to capture rich
declassification policies, including sequencing and alternation.
2.3 Computing with secrets
As we have seen, with standard existential types, values of an abstract type X
must be eliminated with operations provided by the existential type. While so
far the analogy between type abstraction with existential types and expressive
declassification holds nicely, there are some obstacles.
First, with standard existential types, it is simply forbidden to compute with
secrets. For instance, applying the function length: String → Int with a (secret)
value of type X is a type error. However, information-flow type systems are
more flexible: they support computing with secret values, as long as the com-
putation itself is henceforth considered secret, e.g. the value it produces is itself
secret [18]. Allowing secret computations is useful for privileged observers, which
are authorized to see private values.
Faceted types were introduced to support this “dual mode” of information-
flow type systems in the labels-as-types approach [5]. While that work is based
on objects and subtyping, here we develop the notion of existential faceted types:
faceted types of the form T@U , where T indicates the safety type used for the
implementation and U the declassification type used for confidentiality.
Figure 1 shows AccountStore with existential faceted types. Given a public
string (TL denotes T@T ), userPass returns a value that is a string for the privi-
leged observer, and a secret of type X for the public observer (i.e. the attacker).
When computing with a value of type String@X , there are now two options:
either we use a function that expects a value of type String@X as argument,
such as verifyPass, or we use a function that goes beyond declassification, such
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AccountStore , ∃X,Y, Z.[ userPass : StringL → String@X
verifyPass : StringL → String@X → Option [YL]L
userSalary : YL → Int@Z
isSixDigit : Int@Z → BoolL]
Fig. 1. Account store with faceted types
as length, and should therefore produce a fully private result. What type should
such private results have? In order to avoid having to introduce a fresh type
variable, we assume a fixed (unusable) type ⊤, and write IntH to denote Int@⊤.
This supports computing with secrets as follows:
StringH login (StringL guess, StringL username){
if ( length( store .userPass(username)) == length(guess ))...;
}
Instead of being ill-typed, length(store.userPass(username)) is well-typed at type
IntH, so the function login can return a private result, e.g. a private string at
type StringH.
2.4 Public data as (declassifiable) secret
Information-flow type systems allow any value to be considered private. With
existential faceted types, this feature is captured by a subtyping relation such
that for any T , T@T <: T@⊤, and for any X , T@X <: T@⊤. Value flows
that are justified by subtyping are safe from a confidentiality point of view. In
particular, if a (declassifiable) value of type String@X is passed at type StringH,
it is henceforth fully private, disallowing any further declassification.
Additionally, in the presence of declassifiable secrets, of type T@X , one would
also expect public values to be “upgraded” to declassifiable secrets. This requires
the security subtyping relation to admit that, for any type T and type variable
X , we have TL <: T@X .
Note that admitting such flows means that type variables in a declassifica-
tion type position are more permissive than when they occur in a safety type
position. For instance, isSixDigit can be applied to any public integer (of type
IntL), and not only to ones returned by userSalary. In contrast, userSalary can
only be applied to a value opaquely obtained as a result of verifyPass. In ef-
fect, the representation of authentication tokens is still kept abstract, at type YL
(i.e. Y@Y ). This prevents clients from actually knowing how these tokens are
implemented, preserving the benefits of standard existential types. Conversely,
the salary and password expose their representation types (Int and String respec-
tively), thereby enabling secret computation by clients.
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3 Relaxed noninterference with existential types
Existential faceted types support a novel notion of type-based relaxed non-
interference called existential relaxed noninterference (ERNI) that defines if a
program with existential faceted types is secure. ERNI is based on type-based
equivalences between values at existential faceted types. We formally define the
notions of type-based equivalence and ERNI in Section 5, but here we provide
an intuition for this security criterion and the associated reasoning. Let us first
consider simple types, before looking at existential types.
Type-based relaxed noninterference. Two integers are equivalent at type Int@Int =
IntL if they are syntactically equal, meaning that a public observer can distin-
guish between two integers at type IntL. We can characterize the meaning of the
faceted type IntL with the partial equivalence relation EqInt = {(n, n) ∈ Int× Int}.
Using this, two integers v1 and v2 are equivalent at type IntL if they are in the
relation EqInt—meaning they are syntactically equal.
Dually, the type Int@⊤ = IntH characterizes integer values that are indistin-
guishable for a public observer, therefore any two integers are equivalent at type
IntH. Consequently, the meaning of the faceted type IntH is the total relation
AllInt = Int× Int that relates any two integers v1 and v2.
With these base type-based equivalences, one can express the security prop-
erty of functions, open terms, and programs with inputs as follows: a program
p satisfies ERNI at an observation type Sout if, given two input values that are
equivalent at type Sin, the executions of p with each value produce results that
are equivalent at type Sout. This modular reasoning principle is akin to standard
noninterference [18] and type-based relaxed noninterference [5].
Intuitively, Sin models the initial knowledge of the public observer about
the (potentially-secret) input, and Sout denotes the final knowledge that the
public observer has to distinguish results of the executions of the program p.
The program p is secure if, given inputs from the same equivalence class of Sin,
it produces results in the same equivalence class of Sout. Consider the program
e = length(x) where x has type StringH. The program e does not satisfy ERNI at
type IntL, because given two strings “a” and “aa” that are equivalent at StringH,
i.e. (“a”, “aa”) ∈ AllString, we obtain the results 1 and 2, which are not equivalent
at type IntL, i.e. (1, 2) /∈ EqInt. However, e is secure at type IntH.
Relaxed noninterference and existentials. When we introduce faceted types with
type variables such as Int@X , we need to answer: what values are equivalent
at type Int@X? Without stepping into technical details yet, let us say that the
meaning of a type Int@X is an arbitrary partial equivalence relation RX ⊆ Int×
Int, and two values v1 and v2 are equivalent at Int@X if they are in RX . Because
X is an existentially-quantified variable, inside the package implementation that
exports the type variable X , RX is known, but outside the package, i.e. for
clients of a type Int@X , RX is completely abstract: a public observer that opens
a package exporting the type variable X does not know anything about values
of type Int@X .
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For instance, consider again the program e = length(x) but assume that x
now has type String@Y . Does e satisfy ERNI at type IntL? Here, we need to know
what is the relation RY that gives meaning to String@Y . Instead of picking only
one relation RY , ERNI quantifies over all possible relations RY . This universal
quantification over RY corresponds to the standard type abstraction mechanism
for abstract types (i.e. parametricity [15]). That is, the program e satisfies ERNI
at type Int@Int, if it is secure for all relations RY ⊆ String × String. Then, to
show that ERNI at type Int@Int does not hold for e it suffices to exhibit a specific
relation for which ERNI is violated. Take the relation RY = {(“a”, “aa”)}, and
observe that length(“a”) 6= length(“aa”).
Illustration. Finally, we give an intuition of how ERNI accounts for extrinsic
declassification policies. We reuse the salary operations from AccountStore, sim-
plifying the retrieval of the secret salary. The type SalaryPolicy provides a secret
salary and a function isSixDigit to declassify the salary as before.
SalaryPolicy
△
= ∃Z.[salary : Int@Z, isSixDigit : Int@Z → BoolL]
Intuitively two package values p1
△
= pack(Int, v1) as SalaryPolicy and p2
△
=
pack(Int, v2) as SalaryPolicy are equivalent at SalaryPolicyL if v1.salary and v2.salary
are equivalent at Int@Z and v1.isSixDigit and v2.isSixDigit are equivalent at
Int@Z → BoolL, i.e. the functions isSixDigit of v1 and v2 produce equivalent
results at BoolL when given equivalent arguments at Int@Z.
Consider now the program e′ = x.isSixDigit(x.salary) with input x of type
[salary : Int@Z, isSixDigit : Int@Z → BoolL]. Taking into account the above
equivalence for SalaryPolicy, the program e′ satisfies ERNI at type BoolL because
it adheres to the salary policy. Indeed, given any two equivalent packages p1
△
=
pack(Int, v1) as SalaryPolicy and p2
△
= pack(Int, v2) as SalaryPolicy, the expressions
v1.isSixDigit(v1.salary) and v2.isSixDigit(v2.salary) are necessarily equivalent at
type BoolL. However, the program (x.salary)%2 does not satisfy ERNI at IntL,
because given equivalent package implementations v1 , [salary = 100001, · · ·]
and v2 , [salary = 100002, · · ·], it yields 1 for v1 and 0 for v2, and both values
are not equivalent at IntL, i.e. (1, 0) /∈ EqInt.
4 Formal semantics
We model existential faceted types in λ∃SEC, which is essentially the simply-typed
lambda calculus augmented with the unit type, pair types, sum types, existential
types, and faceted types. All the examples presented in Section 2 can thus be
encoded in λ∃SEC using standard techniques. This section covers the syntax, static
and dynamic semantics of λ∃SEC. The formalization of existential relaxed nonin-
terference and the security type soundness of λ∃SEC are presented in Section 5.
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e ::= λx : S.e | e e | x | p | e⊕ e | 〈〉 | 〈e, e〉
| fst e | snd e | inl e | inr e | case t of inl x.e | inr x.e
| pack(T, e) as T | open(X,x) = e in e
(terms)
v ::= λx : S.e | p | 〈〉 | 〈v, v〉 | inl v | inr v | pack(T, v) as T | (values)
T,U ::= S → S | P | 1 | S + S | S × S | ∃X.T | X | ⊤ (types)
P ::= (e.g. Int,String) (primitive types)
S ::= T@U (security types)
TL , T@T TH , T@⊤
Fig. 2. λ∃SEC: Syntax
4.1 Syntax
Figure 2 presents the syntax of λ∃SEC. Expressions e are completely standard [14],
including functions, applications, variables, primitive values , binary operations
on primitive values, the unit value, pairs with their first and second projections,
injections inl e and inr e to introduce sum types, as well as a case construct
to eliminate sums; finally, pack and open introduce and eliminate existential
packages, respectively. Types T include function types S → S, primitive types
P , the unit type 1, sum types S + S, pair types S × S, existential types ∃X.T ,
type variables X and the top type ⊤. A security type S is a faceted type T@U
where T is the safety type and U is the declassification type.
Well-formedness of security types. We now comment on the rules for valid se-
curity types, i.e.facet-wise well-formed types. We have three general form of
security types TL and TH and T@X . While there is no constraint on forming
types TL and TH, such as IntL, XL and IntH, we need two considerations for types
such as Int@X .
The first consideration is that inside an existential type ∃X.T the type vari-
able X , when used as a declassification type, must be uniquely associated to a
concrete safety type. For instance, the existential type ∃X.(String@X → Int@X)
is ill-formed, while ∃X.(Int@X → Int@X) and ∃X.(X@X → Int@X) are well-
formed. For such well-formed types, we use the auxiliary function sftype(∃X.T )
to obtain the safety type associated to X ; for instance sftype(∃X.(X@X →
Int@X)) = Int (undefined on ill-formed types).
The second consideration is when a client opens a package. The expression
open(X, x) = e in e′ binds the type variable X in e′, therefore the expression e′
can declare security types of the form T ′@X . However, for the declaration of the
type T ′@X to be valid, the safety type of the declassification type variable X
must be T ′. For instance, if the safety type of X is Int, the expression e′ cannot
declare security types such as String@X , otherwise computations over secrets
could get stuck. The question is how to determine the safety type T ′ of X in e′.
Crucially, the expression e necessarily has to be of type (∃X.T )L, therefore we
can obtain the safety type for X with sftype(∃X.T ). To keep track of the safety
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type for each type variable X , we use a type variable environment ∆ that maps
type variables to types T (i.e. ∆ ::= • | ∆,X : T )
With the previous considerations in mind, the rules for well-formed security
types are straightforward. In the rest of the paper, we use the judgment ∆ |= S
to mean well-formed security types S under type environment ∆. A well formed
security type S is both facet-wise well-formed and closed with respect to type
variables. We also use ∆ |= Γ to indicate that a type environment is well-formed,
i.e. all types in Γ are well-formed. In the following, we assume well-formed
security types and environments.
4.2 Static Semantics
Figure 3 presents the static semantics of λ∃SEC. Security typing relies on a subtyp-
ing judgment that validates secure information flows. The left-most rule justifies
subtyping by reflexivity. The middle rule justifies subtyping for two security
types with the same safety type, when the declassification type of right security
type is ⊤. Finally, the right-most rule justifies subtyping between a public type
TL and T@X .
As usual, the typing judgment ∆;Γ ⊢ e : S denotes that “the expression e
has type S under the type variable environment ∆ and the type environment
Γ”. The typing rules are mostly standard [14]. Here, we only discuss the special
treatment of security types.
Rule (TVar) gives the security type to a type variable from the type en-
vironment and rule (TS) is the standard subtyping subsumption rule. Rules
(TP), (TFun), (TPair), (TU), (TInl), (TInr) and (TPack) introduce primitive,
function, pair, unit, sum and existential types, respectively. In particular, rule
(TPack) requires the representation type of the package to be more precise than
the safety type associated to X in the existential type, i.e. T ′ ⊑ sftype(∃X.T ).
The precision judgment has only two rules: reflexivity T ⊑ T , and any type is
more precise than a type variable T ⊑ X .
Rules (TApp), (TOp), (TFst), (TSnd), (TCase) and (TOpen) are elimination
rules for function, primitive, pair, sum and existential types, respectively. When
a secret is eliminated, the resulting computation must protect that secret. This
is done with ⌈S′⌉S , which changes the declassification type of S
′ to ⊤ if the type
S is not public:
⌈T1@U1⌉T2@U2 = T1@U1 if T2 = U2, otherwise T1@⊤
Let us illustrate the use of rule (TApp). On the one hand, if the type of the
function expression e1 is (S1 → S2)L, i.e. it represents a public function, then
the type of the function application is S2. On the other hand, if the function
expression e1 has type (S1 → T2@U2)@X or (S1 → T2@U2)H, i.e. it represents
a secret, then the function application has type T2@⊤.
Rule (TOp) uses an auxiliary function Θ to obtain the signature of a prim-
itive operator and ensures that the resulting type protects both operands with
⌈⌈P ′′@P ′′⌉P@U⌉P ′@U ′ . Rules (TFst) and (TSnd) use the same principle to pro-
tect the projections of a pair. Rule (TCase) requires the discriminee to be of
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S <: S
T@U <: T@U T@U <: T@⊤ TL <: T@X
∆;Γ ⊢ e : S
(TVar)
x ∈ dom(Γ )
∆;Γ ⊢ x : Γ (x)
(TS)
∆;Γ ⊢ e : S′ S′ <: S
∆;Γ ⊢ e : S
(TP)
P = Θ(p)
∆;Γ ⊢ p : PL
(TFun)
∆;Γ, x : S ⊢ e : S′
∆;Γ ⊢ λx : S. e : (S → S′)
L
(TPair)
∆;Γ ⊢ e1 : S1 ∆;Γ ⊢ e2 : S2
∆;Γ ⊢ 〈e1, e2〉 : (S1 × S2)L
(TU)
∆;Γ ⊢ 〈〉 : 1L
(TInl)
∆;Γ ⊢ e : S1
∆;Γ ⊢ inl e : (S1 + S2)L
(TInr)
∆;Γ ⊢ e : S2
∆;Γ ⊢ inr e : (S1 + S2)L
(TPack)
∆;Γ ⊢ e : (T [T ′/X])
L
T ′ ⊑ sftype(∃X.T )
∆;Γ ⊢ pack(T ′, e) as ∃X.T : (∃X.T )
L
(TApp)
∆;Γ ⊢ e1 : S S = (S1 → S2)@U
∆;Γ ⊢ e2 : S1
∆;Γ ⊢ e1 e2 : ⌈S2⌉S
(TOp)
Θ(⊕) : P × P ′ → P ′′ ∆;Γ ⊢ e1 : P@U ∆;Γ ⊢ e2 : P
′@U ′
∆;Γ ⊢ e1 ⊕ e2 : ⌈⌈P
′′@P ′′⌉P@U⌉P ′@U′
(TFst)
∆;Γ ⊢ e : S
S = (S1 × S2)@U
∆;Γ ⊢ fst e : ⌈S1⌉S
(TSnd)
∆;Γ ⊢ e : S
S = (S1 × S2)@U
∆;Γ ⊢ snd e : ⌈S2⌉S
(TCase)
∆;Γ ⊢ e : S S = (S1 + S2)@U
∆;Γ, x1 : S1 ⊢ e1 : S
′ ∆;Γ, x2 : S2 ⊢ e2 : S
′
∆;Γ ⊢ case e of inl x1.e1 | inr x2.e2 : ⌈S
′⌉S
(TOpen)
∆;Γ ⊢ e : S S = (∃X.T )@U T ′
△
= sftype(∃X.T )
∆,X : T ′;Γ, x : TL ⊢ e
′ : S′ ∆ |= S′
∆;Γ ⊢ open(X,x) = e in e′ : ⌈S′⌉S
Fig. 3. λ∃SEC: Static semantics
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type (S1 + S2)@U , and both branches must have the same type S
′. Likewise, it
protects the resulting computation with ⌈S′⌉S .
Finally, rule (TOpen) applies to expressions of the form open(X, x) = e in e′,
by typing the body expression e′ in an extended type variable environment
∆,X : T ′ and a type environment Γ, x : TL. Two points are worth noticing.
First, the association X : T ′ allows us to verify that security types of the form
T ′@X defined in the body expression e′ are well-formed. Second, we make the
well-formedness requirement explicit for the result type ∆ |= S′, which implies
that S′ is facet-wise well-formed and closed under ∆—i.e. the type variable X
cannot appear in S′.
4.3 Dynamic semantics and type safety
The execution of λ∃SEC expressions is defined with a standard call-by-value small-
step dynamic semantics based on evaluation contexts (Figure 4). We abstract
over the execution of primitive operators over primitive values using an auxiliary
function θ.
E ::= [ ] | fst E | snd E | case E of inl x1.e1 | inr x2.e2
| E e | v E | E ⊕ e | v ⊕ E | open(X,x) = E in e′
(evaluation contexts)
fst 〈v1, v2〉 7−→ v1
snd 〈v1, v2〉 7−→ v2
case inl v of inl x1.e1 | inr x2.e2 7−→ e1 [v/x1]
case inr v of inl x1.e1 | inr x2.e2 7−→ e2 [v/x2]
(λx : S. e) v 7−→ e [v/x]
p1 ⊕ p2 7−→ θ(⊕, p1, p2)
open(X,x) = (pack(T ′, v) as ∃X.T ) in e′ 7−→ e′ [v/x] [T ′/X]
e 7−→ e′
E[e] 7−→ E[e′]
Fig. 4. λ∃SEC: Dynamic semantics
We define the predicate safe(e) to indicate that the evaluation of the expres-
sion e does not get stuck.
Definition 1 (Safety). safe(e) ⇐⇒ ∀e′. e 7−→∗ e′ =⇒ e′ = v or ∃e′′. e′ 7−→
e′′
Well-typed λ∃SEC closed terms are safe.
Theorem 1 (Syntactic type safety). ⊢ e : S =⇒ safe(e)
Having formally defined the language λ∃SEC, we move to the main result of
this paper, which is to show that the λ∃SEC is sound from a security standpoint,
i.e. its type system enforces existential relaxed noninterference.
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5 Existential relaxed noninterference, formally
In Section 3 we gave an overview of existential relaxed noninterference (ERNI),
explaining how it depends on type-based equivalences. To formally capture these
type-based equivalences, we define a logical relation, defined by induction on the
structure of types. To account for type variables, we build upon prior work on
logical relations for parametricity [2, 15, 17]. Then, we formally define ERNI
on top of this logical relation. Finally, we prove that the type system of λ∃SEC
enforces existential relaxed noninterference.
5.1 Logical relation for type-based equivalence
As explained in Section 3, two values v1 and v2 are equivalent at type S, if they
are in the partial equivalence relation denoted by S. To capture this, the logical
relation (Figure 5) interprets types as set of atoms, i.e. pairs of closed expressions.
We use Atom [T1, T2] to characterize the set of atoms with expressions of type T1
and T2 respectively. This definition appeals to a simply-typed judgment ∆;Γ ⊢1
e : T that does not consider the declassification type and is therefore completely
standard. The use of this simple type system clearly separates the definition of
secure programs from the enforcement mechanism, i.e. the security type system
of Figure 3.
In Section 3 we explained what it means to be equivalent at type Int@X
appealing to a relation on integers RX ⊆ Int× Int . To formally characterize the
set of valid relations RX for types T1 and T2 we use the definition Rel [T1, T2].
To keep track of the relation associated to a type variable, most definitions are
indexed by an environment ρ that maps type variables X to triplets (T1, T2, R),
where T1 and T2 are two representation types of X and R is a relation on closed
values of type T1 and T2 (i.e. ρ ::= ∅ | ρ [X 7→ (T1, T2, R)]). We will explain later
where these types T1 and T2 come from. We write ρ1(U) (resp. ρ2(U)) to replace
all type variables of ρ in types with the associated type T1 (resp. T2), and ρR(X)
to retrieve the relation R of a type variable X in ρ.
Figure 5 defines the value interpretation of a type T , denoted VJT Kρ, then
the value interpretation of a security type S, denoted VJSKρ, and finally the
expression interpretation of a type S, denoted CJSKρ.
Interpreting concrete types. We first explain the definitions that do not involve
types variables. VJT@⊤Kρ (resp. VJT@T Kρ) characterizes when values of T are
indistinguishable (resp. distinguishable) for the public observer. VJT@⊤Kρ is
defined as Atom [ρ1(T ), ρ2(T )] indicating that any two values of type T are
equivalent at type T@⊤. Note that this also includes values of type X@⊤.
Two public values are equivalent at a security type T@T if they are equiv-
alent at their safety type, i.e. VJTLKρ = VJT Kρ. The definition VJP Kρ relates
syntactically-equal primitive values at type P . Two functions are equivalent at
type S1 → S2, denoted VJS1 → S2Kρ, if given equivalent arguments at type S1,
their applications are equivalent expressions at type S2. Two pairs are equivalent
at type S1×S2 if they are component-wise equivalent. Two values are equivalent
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Atom [T1, T2] = {(e1, e2) | •; • ⊢1 e1 : T1 ∧ •; • ⊢1 e2 : T2}
Atomρ [T ] = Atom [ρ1(T ), ρ2(T )]
Rel [T1, T2] = {R ⊆ Atom [T1, T2]}
VJ1Kρ = {(〈〉 , 〈〉) ∈ Atomρ [1]}
VJP Kρ = {(p, p) ∈ Atomρ [P ]}
VJS1 → S2Kρ = {(v1, v2) ∈ Atomρ [S1 → S2] |
∀v′1, v
′
2. (v
′
1, v
′
2) ∈ VJS1Kρ =⇒ (v1 v
′
1, v2 v
′
2) ∈ CJS2Kρ}
VJS1 × S2Kρ = {(〈v1, v
′
1〉 , 〈v2, v
′
2〉) ∈ Atomρ [S1 × S2] | (v1, v2) ∈ VJS1Kρ ∧ (v
′
1, v
′
2) ∈ VJS2Kρ}
VJS1 + S2Kρ = {(inl v1, inl v2) ∈ Atomρ [S1 + S2] | (v1, v2) ∈ VJS1Kρ}
∪{(inr v1, inr v2) ∈ Atomρ [S1 + S2] | (v1, v2) ∈ VJS2Kρ}
VJ∃X.T Kρ = {(pack(T1, v1) as ∃X.T, pack(T2, v2) as ∃X.T ) ∈ Atomρ [∃X.T ] |
T1 ⊑ sftype(∃X.T ) ∧ T2 ⊑ sftype(∃X.T ) ∧
∃R ∈ Rel [T1, T2]. (v1, v2) ∈ VJT Kρ [X 7→ (T1, T2, R)]}
VJXKρ = ρR(X)
VJT@XKρ = ρR(X) ∪ VJT Kρ
VJT@⊤Kρ = Atom [ρ1(T ), ρ2(T )]
VJT@T Kρ = VJT Kρ
CJT@UKρ = {(e1, e2) ∈ Atomρ [T ] | ∀v1, v2. e1 7−→
∗ v1 ∧ e2 7−→
∗ v2 ∧ (v1, v2) ∈ VJT@UKρ}
Fig. 5. λ∃SEC Logical relation for type-based equivalence
at S1 + S2 if they are either both left-injected values inl v1 and inl v2 such as v1
and v2 are equivalent at S1, or both right-injected values inr v1 and inr v2 such
as v1 and v2 are equivalent at S2.
Finally, two expressions e1 and e2 are equivalent at type T@U , denoted
CJT@UKρ, if they both reduce to values v1 and v2 respectively and these values
are related at type T@U . (Note that all well-typed λ∃SEC expressions terminate.)
Interpreting existential types. We now explain the value interpretation of exis-
tential types ∃X.T , type variables X and security types of the form T@X , which
all involve type variables.
Two public package expressions pack(T1, v1) as ∃X.T and pack(T2, v2) as ∃X.T
are equivalent at type ∃X.T , denoted VJ∃X.T Kρ, if there exists a relation R on
the representation types T1 and T2 that makes the package implementations v1
and v2 equivalent at type T , denoted (v1, v2) ∈ VJT Kρ [X 7→ (T1, T2, R)]. Note
that if the existential type ∃X.T has a concrete safety type T ′ (not a type vari-
able) forX , then both T1 and T2 necessarily have to be equal to T
′. Otherwise, T1
and T2 are arbitrary types. Two values are related at type X , denoted VJXKρ,
if they are in the relational interpretation R associated to X (retrieved with
ρR(X)). Two values are related at type T@X , denoted VJT@XKρ, if they are
in ρR(X), or if they are publicly-equivalent values of type T (i.e. a package can
accept public values of type T where values of T@X are expected).
We illustrate these formal type-based equivalences in Section 6, after formally
defining existential relaxed noninterference and proving security type soundness.
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5.2 Existential relaxed noninterference
As illustrated in Section 3, ERNI is a modular property that accounts for open
expressions over both variables and type variables. To account for open expres-
sions, we first need to define the relational interpretation of a type environment
Γ and a type variable environment ∆:
GJ·Kρ = {(∅, ∅)}
GJΓ ;x : SKρ = {(γ1 [x 7→ v1], γ2 [x 7→ v2]) | (γ1, γ2) ∈ GJΓ Kρ ∧ (v1, v2) ∈ VJSKρ}
DJ·K = {∅}
DJ∆;X : T K = {ρ [X 7→ (T1, T2, R)] | ρ ∈ DJ∆K ∧ T1 ⊑ T ∧ T2 ⊑ T ∧ R ∈ Rel [T1, T2]}
The type environment interpretation GJΓ Kρ is standard; it characterizes when
two value substitutions γ1 and γ2 are equivalent. A value substitution γ is a
mapping from variables to closed values (i.e. γ ::= ∅ | γ [x 7→ v]). Two value
substitutions are equivalent if for all associations x : S in Γ , the mapped values
to x in γ1 and γ2 are equivalent at S. Finally, the interpretation of a type variable
environment ∆, denoted DJ∆K, is a set of type substitutions ρ with the same
domain as ∆. For each type variable X bound to T in ∆, such a ρ maps X to
triples (T1, T2, R), where T1 and T2 are closed types that are more precise than
T . R must be a valid relation for the types T1 and T2. We write ρ1(e) (resp.
ρ2(e)) to replace all type variables of ρ in terms with their associated type T1
(resp. T2),
We can now formally define ERNI. An expression e satisfies existential re-
laxed noninterference for a type variable environment ∆ and a type variable Γ
at the S, denoted ERNI(∆,Γ, e, S) if, given a type substitution ρ satisfying ∆
and two values substitutions γ1 and γ2 that are equivalent at Γ , applying the
substitutions produces equivalent expressions at type S.
Definition 2 (Existential relaxed noninterference).
ERNI(∆,Γ, e, S)⇐⇒ ∃T, U. S , T@U ∧ ∆;Γ ⊢1 e : T ∧ ∆ |= Γ ∧ ∆ |= S ∧
∀ρ, γ1, γ2. ρ ∈ DJ∆K. (γ1, γ2) ∈ GJΓ Kρ =⇒ (ρ1(γ1(e)), ρ2(γ2(e))) ∈ CJSKρ
5.3 Security type soundness
Instead of directly proving that the type system of Figure 3 implies existential
relaxed noninterference for all well-typed terms, we prove it through the standard
definition of logically-related open terms [5]:
Definition 3 (Logically-related open terms).
∆;Γ ⊢ e1 ≈ e2 : S ⇐⇒ ∆;Γ ⊢ ei : S ∧ ∆ |= Γ ∧ ∆ |= S ∧
∀ρ, γ1, γ2. ρ ∈ DJ∆K.(γ1, γ2) ∈ GJΓ Kρ =⇒ (ρ1(γ1(e1)), ρ2(γ2(e2)) ∈ CJSKρ
The next lemma captures that if an expression is logically related to itself,
then it satisfies ERNI.
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Lemma 1 (Self logical relation implies PRNI).
∆;Γ ⊢ e ≈ e : S =⇒ ERNI(∆,Γ, e, S)
The proof of security type soundness relies on the Fundamental Property of
the logical relation: a well-typed λ∃SEC term is related to itself.
Theorem 2 (Fundamental property). ∆;Γ ⊢ e : S =⇒ ∆;Γ ⊢ e ≈ e : S
Security type soundness follows from Lemma 1 and Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 (Security type soundness). ∆;Γ ⊢ e : S =⇒ ERNI(∆,Γ, e, S)
Proof. By induction on the typing derivation of e. Following Ahmed [2], we define
a compatibility lemma for each typing rule; then, each case of the induction
directly follows from the corresponding compatibility lemma.
6 Illustration
With all the formal definitions at hand, we end by revisiting the informal ex-
ample of Section 3. SalaryPolicy can be encoded in λ∃SEC as follow : ∃X.Int@X ×
(Int@X → BoolL). Let us show that the following two packages are equivalent
at type SalaryPolicyL (gte is a curried comparison function, and we omit the as):
p1
△
= pack(Int, 〈100001, gte(100000)〉) p2
△
= pack(Int, 〈100002, gte(100000)〉)
The definition of VJSalaryPolicyK∅ requires picking a relation R ∈ Rel [Int, Int].
Pick R = {(100001, 100002)}. Then apply the rest of the definitions to ver-
ify that the package implementations are equivalent at VJInt@X × (Int@X →
BoolL)K∅ [X 7→ (Int, Int, R)]. Use the ρR(X) part of the definition of
VJInt@XK∅ [X 7→ (Int, Int, R)] to show that the first components 100001 and
100002 are equivalent at Int@X , i.e. (100001, 100002) ∈ ρR(X).
First we illustrate the formal reasoning that we obtain from Theorem 3. Let
us pose ∆ = X : Int and Γ = x : (Int@X × (Int@X → BoolL))L. The program
e = (snd x) (fst x) has type BoolL, therefore, by Theorem 3, ERNI(∆,Γ, e,BoolL)
holds—e is secure at BoolL. We can verify this formally. By Definition 2 we
have to assume an arbitrary type substitution ρ ∈ DJX : IntK and two values
substitutions (γ1, γ2) ∈ GJx : (Int@X × (Int@X → BoolL))LKρ and to show that
(ρ1(γ1((snd x) (fst x))), ρ2(γ2((snd x) (fst x)))) ∈ CJBoolLKρ. From (γ1, γ2) ∈
GJx : (Int@X × (Int@X → BoolL))LKρ we know that γ1 = x 7→ v1 and γ1 = x 7→
v2, such as (v1, v2) ∈ VJ(Int@X × (Int@X → BoolL))LKρ. Then (snd v1) (fst v1) 7−→
∗
v′11 v
′
12 and (snd v2) (fst v2) 7−→
∗ v′21 v
′
22, such that (v
′
11, v
′
21) ∈ VJInt@X →
BoolLKρ and (v
′
12
, v′
22
) ∈ VJInt@XKρ. After the previous reductions we have to
verify that (v′11 v
′
12, v
′
21 v
′
22) ∈ CJBoolLKρ. At this point, instantiate (v
′
11, v
′
21) ∈
VJInt@X → BoolLKρ with (v′12, v
′
22
) ∈ VJInt@XKρ to obtain (v′
11
v′
12
, v′
21
v′
22
) ∈
CJBoolLKρ.
Second, we formally show why ERNI(∆,Γ, (fst x)%2, IntL) does not hold. In-
stantiate Definition 2 with ρ = X 7→ (Int, Int, R) and γ1 = x 7→ 〈100001, gte(100000)〉
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and γ2 = x 7→ 〈100002, gte(100000)〉. Note that ρ = X 7→ (Int, Int, R) ∈ DJX :
IntK and (γ1, γ2) ∈ GJΓ Kρ. To show (ρ1(γ1((fst x)%2)), ρ2(γ2((fst x)%2))) ∈
CJIntLKρ requires showing (100001%2, 100002%2) ∈ CJIntLKρ, which means show-
ing (1, 0) ∈ CJIntLKρ—which is false. Similarly, we can verify that ERNI(∆,Γ, x.salary, IntL)
does not hold, which means that a declassifiable secret cannot be directly ob-
served by a public observer.
7 Related Work
We have already extensively discussed the relation to the original formulation of
the labels-as-types approach in an object-oriented setting [5], itself inspired by
the work on declassification policies (labels-as-functions) of Li and Zdancewic
[9]. Formulating type-based declassification with existential types shows how to
exploit another type abstraction mechanism that is found in non-object-oriented
languages, with abstract data types and modules. Also, existential types support
extrinsic declassification policies, which are not expressible in the receiver-centric
approach of objects. For instance, the AccountStore example of Section 2 is not
supported by design in the object-oriented approach.
The extrinsic declassification policies supported by our approach are closely
related to trusted declassification [8], where declassification is globally defined,
associating principals that own secrets with trusted (external) methods that
can declassify these secrets. In our approach, the relation between secrets and
declassifiers is not globally defined, but is local to an existential type and its
usage. In both approaches the implementations of declassifiers have a privileged
view of the secrets.
Bowman and Ahmed [3] present a translation of noninterference into para-
metricity with a compiler from the Dependency Core Calculus (DCC) [1] to
System Fω. In a recent (as yet unpublished) article, Ngo et al. [13] extend this
work to support translating declassification policies, inspired by prior work on
type-based relaxed noninterference [5]. They first provide a translation into ab-
stract types of the polymorphic lambda calculus [15], and then into signatures
of a module calculus [4]. While that work and ours encode declassification poli-
cies via existential types (module signatures), we focus on providing a surface
language for information flow control with type-based declassification. In par-
ticular, their translated programs do not support computing with secrets, which
is enabled in both this work and the original work of Cruz et al. [5] thanks to
faceted types. Additionally, they only model first-order secrets (integers), while
our modular reasoning principle seamlessly accommodates higher-order secrets.
In another very recent piece of work, Cruz and Tanter [6] extend the object-
oriented approach to type-based relaxed noninterference with parametric poly-
morphism, thereby supporting polymorphic declassification policies. Polymor-
phic declassification for object types is achieved with type variables at the
method signature level, which supports the specification of polymorphic poli-
cies of the form T ⊳ X . Existential types are closely related to universal types.
In particular, the client of a package that exports a type variable X must be
Existential Types for Relaxed Noninterference 19
polymorphic with respect to X ; hence our work supports a form of declassifi-
cation polymorphism in the client code. It would be interesting to extend λ∃SEC
with universal types in order to study the interaction of both abstraction mech-
anisms in a standard functional setting. Finally, because of the receiver-centric
perspective of objects, they have to resort to ad-hoc polymorphism to properly
account for primitive types. Here, primitive types do not require any special
treatment for declassification polymorphism, because of our extrinsic approach
to declassification.
The idea of using the abstraction mechanism of modules to express a form of
declassification can also be found in the work of Nanevski et al. [12] on Relational
Hoare Type Theory (RHTT). RHTT is formulated with a monadic security type
constructor STsec A(p, q), where p is a pre-condition on the heap, and q is a post-
condition relating output values, input heaps and output heaps. Thanks to the
expressive power of the underlying dependent type theory, preconditions and
postconditions can characterize very precise declassification policies. The price
to pay is that proofs of noninterference have to be provided explicitly as proof
terms (or discharged via tactics or other means when possible), while our less
expressive approach is a simple, non-dependent type system. Finding the right
balance between the expressiveness and the complexity of the typing discipline
to express security policies is an active subject of research.
8 Conclusion
We present a novel approach to type-based relaxed noninterference, based on ex-
istential types as the underlying type abstraction mechanism. In contrast to the
object-oriented, subtyping-based approach, the existential approach naturally
supports external declassification policies. This work shows that the general ap-
proach of faceted security types for expressive declassification can be applied in
non-object-oriented languages that support abstract data types or modules. As
such, it represents a step towards providing a practical realization of information-
flow security typing that accounts for controlled and expressive declassification
with a modular reasoning principle about security.
An immediate venue for future work that would be crucial in practice is to
develop type inference for declassification types, which should reduce to stan-
dard type inference [7]. Finally, a particularly interesting perspective is to study
the combination of the existential approach with the object-oriented approach,
thereby bridging the gap towards a practical implementation in a full-fledged
programming language like Scala that features all these type abstraction mech-
anisms.
9 References
[1] Abadi, M., Banerjee, A., Heintze, N., Riecke, J.G.: A core calculus of dependency.
In: Proceedings of the 26th ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Lan-
guages (POPL 99). pp. 147–160. ACM Press, San Antonio, TX, USA (Jan 1999)
20 R. Cruz and E´. Tanter
[2] Ahmed, A.: Step-indexed syntactic logical relations for recursive and quantified
types. In: Sestoft, P. (ed.) Proceedings of the 15th European Symposium on
Programming Languages and Systems (ESOP 2006). Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 3924, pp. 69–83. Springer-Verlag, Vienna, Austria (Mar 2006)
[3] Bowman, W.J., Ahmed, A.: Noninterference for free. In: Proceedings of the 20th
ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Functional Programming (ICFP 2015). pp. 101–
113. ACM Press, Vancouver, Canada (Aug 2015)
[4] Crary, K.: Modules, abstraction, and parametric polymorphism. In: Proceedings
of the 44th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming
Languages (POPL 2017). pp. 100–113. ACM Press, Paris, France (Jan 2017)
[5] Cruz, R., Rezk, T., Serpette, B., Tanter, E´.: Type abstraction for relaxed nonin-
terference. In: Mu¨ller, P. (ed.) Proceedings of the 31st European Conference on
Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings
in Informatics (LIPIcs), vol. 74, pp. 7:1–7:27. Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum
fuer Informatik, Barcelona, Spain (Jun 2017)
[6] Cruz, R., Tanter, E´.: Polymorphic relaxed noninterference. In: Proceedings of the
IEEE Secure Development Conference (SecDev 2019). IEEE Computer Society
Press, McLean, VA, USA (Sep 2019), to appear
[7] Damas, L., Milner, R.: Principal type-schemes for functional programs. In: De-
Millo, R.A. (ed.) Proceedings of the 16th ACM Symposium on Principles of Pro-
gramming Languages (POPL 89). pp. 207–212. ACM Press, Albuquerque, New
Mexico, USA (Jan 1982)
[8] Hicks, B., King, D., McDaniel, P., Hicks, M.: Trusted declassification: high-level
policy for a security-typed language. In: Proceedings of the workshop on Pro-
gramming Languages and Analysis for Security (PLAS 2006. pp. 65–74 (2006)
[9] Li, P., Zdancewic, S.: Downgrading policies and relaxed noninterference. In: Pro-
ceedings of the 32nd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Pro-
gramming Languages (POPL 2005). pp. 158–170. ACM Press, Long Beach, CA,
USA (Jan 2005)
[10] Mitchell, J.C., Plotkin, G.D.: Abstract types have existential type. ACM Trans-
actions on Programming Languages and Systems 10(3), 470–502 (Jul 1988)
[11] Myers, A.C.: Jif homepage. http://www.cs.cornell.edu/jif/ (accessed March 2019)
[12] Nanevski, A., Banerjee, A., Garg, D.: Verification of information flow and access
control policies with dependent types. In: Proceedings of the 32nd IEEE Sympo-
sium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2011). pp. 165–179. IEEE Computer Society
Press, Berkeley, California, USA (May 2011)
[13] Ngo, M., Naumann, D.A., Rezk, T.: Typed-based relaxed noninterference for free.
CoRR abs/1905.00922 (2019), https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.00922
[14] Pierce, B.C.: Types and programming languages. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
USA (2002)
[15] Reynolds, J.C.: Types, abstraction, and parametric polymorphism. In: Mason,
R.E.A. (ed.) Information Processing 83. pp. 513–523. Elsevier (1983)
[16] Sabelfeld, A., Sands, D.: Declassification: Dimensions and principles. Journal of
Computer Security 17(5), 517–548 (2009)
[17] Wadler, P.: Theorems for free! In: Proceedings of the Fourth International Con-
ference on Functional Programming Languages and Computer Architecture. pp.
347–359. FPCA ’89, ACM, London, United Kingdom (1989)
[18] Zdancewic, S.: Programming Languages for Information Security. Ph.D. thesis,
Cornell University (Aug 2002)
